Coffman, E. J.
| Occupation: | Philosopher / Professor |
|---|---|
| Corporate Relations: | University of Tennessee |
| Geographical Relations: | Location of work: Knoxville, Tenn. Country: United States (XD-US) |
| Biographical References: |  GND (1071684507)Vorlage; Homepage |
| Subsystems: | Index Theologicus |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Coffman, E. J. | |
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| 670 | |b Internet |u http://web.utk.edu/~philosop/staff/coffman.html | ||
| 670 | |a Vorlage; Homepage | ||
| 678 | |b Research Interests: My research and teaching revolve around main issues in contemporary epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of action, and philosophy of religion. Most of my work so far has been concerned with one or another of four interrelated topics: ◾The nature of luck, and its bearing—for better or worse (or both)—on the nature and scope of human knowledge and free, morally responsible action. ◾The epistemic requirements on free, morally responsible action (“What must you know—or at least believe, justifiedly or otherwise—to freely do things for which you deserve moral credit or criticism?”). ◾Two important connected questions about the nature of knowledge: (1) Can whatever it is that “fills the gap” between mere true belief and knowledge (typically labeled warrant) be had by false beliefs as well as true ones (the warrant fallibilism/infallibilism debate)? (2) Are the conditions for your knowing something in any way sensitive to how important it is to you that the thing in question turn out to be true (the pragmatic encroachment debate)? ◾The nature of, and relations between, epistemically permissible (proper, justified) belief and assertion; the bearing this issue has on a central debate about the semantics of knowledge-ascribing and -denying sentences (the contextualism/invariantism debate); and the bearing of that semantic issue on the nature of knowledge itself (in particular, the aforementioned pragmatic encroachment debate). I’m also interested in the relations among knowledge, justification, and evidence (both in general, and regarding philosophical, moral, and religious beliefs in particular); the epistemological significance of disagreement; and key problems concerning what God’s knowledge and action are (would be) like, and how they (would) relate to human knowledge and action. | ||
| 692 | |a Luck: Its nature and significance for human knowledge and agency | ||
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