Is My Feeling Your Pain Bad for Others? Empathy as Virtue Versus Empathy as Fixed Trait

The purpose of this article is to (1) critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz against empathy, and (2) to argue instead that empathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it alw...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Nebentitel:Is empathy immoral?
1. VerfasserIn: Peterson, Gregory R. 1966- (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Wiley-Blackwell [2017]
In: Zygon
Jahr: 2017, Band: 52, Heft: 1, Seiten: 232-257
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Bloom, Paul 1963- / Prinz, Jesse J. / Einfühlung / Moralisches Handeln
RelBib Classification:AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus
AE Religionspsychologie
NCC Sozialethik
weitere Schlagwörter:B Paul Bloom
B emotional empathy
B Virtue
B Cognitive empathy
B Dual processing
B Jesse Prinz
B Moral Psychology
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:The purpose of this article is to (1) critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz against empathy, and (2) to argue instead that empathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it always functions well, and empathy sometimes contributes to behavior that is partial and unfair. In some of their writings, both Bloom and Prinz endorse the view that empathy is a fixed trait, but there is little reason to think this, and the studies that they cite do not support this view. Further, a number of recent studies suggest the opposite: our empathic reactions are malleable and subject to environmental effects and learning. Although our capacities for cognitive and emotional empathy are clearly not sufficient for being moral, I argue that they are functionally necessary traits that, like other virtues, must be cultivated correctly.
ISSN:1467-9744
Enthält:Enthalten in: Zygon
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/zygo.12330