Molinists (still) cannot endorse the consequence argument
Perszyk (Faith Philos 20:131-151, ) has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom ( CCFs) and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga (in: Molinism: the conte...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2015
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2015, Volume: 77, Issue: 3, Pages: 231-246 |
Further subjects: | B
Molinism
B Consequence argument B FREE will & determinism B Accidental necessity B Argument B Libertarianism B Compatibilism B Grace (Theology) B Middle Knowledge |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |