Did god know it? God's relation to a world of chance and randomness
A common type of argument against the existence of God is to argue that certain essential features associated with the existence of God are inconsistent with certain other features to be found in the actual world. (Cf. Göcke () for an analysis of the different ways to deploy the term 'God'...
| Veröffentlicht in: | International journal for philosophy of religion |
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| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2015
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
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| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Propensity
B Theism B Process theology B BELIEF & doubt B Open Theism B Predictability B Religion Philosophy B Randomness B Classical Theism B God B Chance |
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Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Zusammenfassung: | A common type of argument against the existence of God is to argue that certain essential features associated with the existence of God are inconsistent with certain other features to be found in the actual world. (Cf. Göcke () for an analysis of the different ways to deploy the term 'God' in philosophical and theological discourse and for an analysis of the logical form of arguments for and against the existence of God.) A recent example of this type of argument against the existence of God is based on the assumption that there are random processes or chancy states of affairs in the actual world that contradict God being absolute sovereign over his creation: Chancy states of affairs are said to entail a denial of divine providence or omniscience. (For instance, Smith (, p. 195) argues that 'classical Big Bang cosmology is inconsistent with theism due to the unpredictable nature of the Big Bang singularity.') More often than not, however, this apparent conflict is formulated only intuitively and lacks sufficient conceptual clarification of the crucial terms involved. As a consequence, it is seldom clear where the conflict really lies. In what follows, I first provide a brief analysis of chance and randomness before I turn to cosmological and evolutionary arguments against the existence of God that in some way or other are based on chance and randomness. I end by way of comparing three popular conceptions of God as regards their ability to deal with God's relation to a world of chance and randomness. Neither classical theism, nor open theism, nor indeed process panentheism has difficulties in accounting for God's relation to a world of chance and randomness. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-015-9531-4 |