How not to render an explanatory version of the evidential argument from evil immune to skeptical theism

Among the things that students of the problem of evil think about is whether explanatory versions of the evidential argument from evil are better than others, better than William Rowe's famous versions of the evidential argument, for example. Some of these students claim that the former are bet...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Howard-Snyder, Daniel (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Nature B. V 2015
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2015, Volume: 78, Issue: 3, Pages: 277-284
Further subjects:B Theism
B Atheism
B ROWE, William L., 1931-2015
B GOOD & evil
B Theodicy
B Trent Dougherty
B problem of evil
B Skeptical theism
B God
B Dougherty, Trent
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Summary:Among the things that students of the problem of evil think about is whether explanatory versions of the evidential argument from evil are better than others, better than William Rowe's famous versions of the evidential argument, for example. Some of these students claim that the former are better than the latter in no small part because the former, unlike the latter, avoid the sorts of worries raised by so-called 'skeptical theists'. Indeed, Trent Dougherty claims to have constructed an explanatory version that is 'fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism'. I argue that he has done no such thing.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-014-9501-2