The movement from ethics to social relationships for Levinas, and why decency obscures obligation
According to Emmanuel Levinas, the individual bears an infinite obligation to the other person. In the Talmudic reading 'Judaism and revolution,' Levinas suggests that we move from the ethical encounter (and infinite obligation) to social relationships (with limited obligations) using cont...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2016
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2016, Volume: 79, Issue: 2, Pages: 89-100 |
Further subjects: | B
Talmudic reading
B Social Contract B Social Responsibility B Duty B Levinas B Judaism B Religious Aspects B COMMON decency B Social Order B Ethical relationships |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | According to Emmanuel Levinas, the individual bears an infinite obligation to the other person. In the Talmudic reading 'Judaism and revolution,' Levinas suggests that we move from the ethical encounter (and infinite obligation) to social relationships (with limited obligations) using contracts-both particular contracts and the social contract. So social relationships are created by limiting obligation, and as a result these relationships can only be practically acceptable, not ethical. Jewish religious practice for Levinas should also be understood as a set of negotiated limits to our infinite obligation. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-015-9522-5 |