The Defect in Effective Skeptical Scenarios

What epistemic defect needs to show up in a skeptical scenario if it is to effectively target some belief? According to the false belief account, the targeted belief must be false in the skeptical scenario. According to the competing ignorance account, the targeted belief must fall short of being kn...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Murphy, Peter (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Brill 2013
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2013, Volume: 3, Issue: 4, Pages: 271-281
Further subjects:B skeptical scenarios closure principle underdetermination principle KK principle
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
Volltext (Verlag)

MARC

LEADER 00000caa a22000002 4500
001 1561895520
003 DE-627
005 20220604141258.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 170808s2013 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1163/22105700-03011096  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1561895520 
035 |a (DE-576)491895526 
035 |a (DE-599)BSZ491895526 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rakwb 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 0  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Murphy, Peter  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a The Defect in Effective Skeptical Scenarios 
264 1 |c 2013 
300 |a Online-Ressource 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a What epistemic defect needs to show up in a skeptical scenario if it is to effectively target some belief? According to the false belief account, the targeted belief must be false in the skeptical scenario. According to the competing ignorance account, the targeted belief must fall short of being knowledge in the skeptical scenario. This paper argues for two claims. The first is that, contrary to what is often assumed, the ignorance account is superior to the false belief account. The second is that the ignorance account ultimately hobbles the skeptic. It does so for two reasons. First, when this account is joined with either a closure-based skeptical argument or a skeptical underdetermination argument, the best the skeptic can do is show that we don’t know that we know. And second, the ignorance account directly implies the maligned KK principle. 
650 4 |a skeptical scenarios  |x closure principle  |x underdetermination principle  |x KK principle 
773 0 8 |i In  |t International journal for the study of skepticism  |d Leiden : Brill, 2011  |g 3(2013), 4, Seite 271-281  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)660812843  |w (DE-600)2610085-X  |w (DE-576)345005341  |x 2210-5700  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:3  |g year:2013  |g number:4  |g pages:271-281 
856 |u https://philpapers.org/archive/MURTDI.pdf  |x unpaywall  |z Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang  |h repository [oa repository (via OAI-PMH title and first author match)] 
856 4 0 |u http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-03011096  |x Verlag  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mteo 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 2976751412 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1561895520 
LOK |0 005 20170808150514 
LOK |0 008 170808||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 935   |a bril 
OAS |a 1 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw 
REL |a 1 
SUB |a REL