P. F. Strawson’s Free Will Naturalism
This is an explication and defense of P. F. Strawson’s naturalist theory of free will and moral responsibility. I respond to a set of criticisms of the view by free will skeptics, compatibilists, and libertarians who adopt the core assumption: Strawson thinks that our reactive attitudes provide the...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
2017
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2017, Volume: 7, Issue: 1, Pages: 26-52 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Strawson, Peter Frederick 1919-2006
/ Free will
/ Naturalism (Philosophy)
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Further subjects: | B
P. F. Strawson
skepticism
naturalism
free will
moral responsibility
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Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
Summary: | This is an explication and defense of P. F. Strawson’s naturalist theory of free will and moral responsibility. I respond to a set of criticisms of the view by free will skeptics, compatibilists, and libertarians who adopt the core assumption: Strawson thinks that our reactive attitudes provide the basis for a rational justification of our blaming and praising practices. My primary aim is to explain and defend Strawson’s naturalism in light of criticisms based on the core assumption. Strawson’s critiques of incompatibilism and free will skepticism are not intended to provide rational justifications for either compatibilism or the claim that some persons have free will. Hence, the charge that Strawson’s “arguments” are faulty is misplaced. The core assumption resting behind such critiques is mistaken. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contains: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-006011220 |