‘Hinge Propositions’ and the ‘Logical’ Exclusion of Doubt
Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘hinge propositions’—those propositions that stand fast for us and around which all empirical enquiry turns—remains controversial and elusive, and none of the recent attempts to make sense of it strike me as entirely satisfactory. The literature on this topic tends to divide...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2016
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2016, Volume: 6, Issue: 2/3, Pages: 165-181 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Cognition theory
/ Outside world
/ Verbindungselement
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| Further subjects: | B
Certainty
doubt
knowledge
grammatical proposition
groundlessness
hinge propositions
radical scepticism
pragmatism
Wittgenstein
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| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |