Skepticism, Suspension of Judgment, and Norms for Belief
According to Sextus Empiricus, the Skeptic suspends judgment in response to equipollence. This fact has two significant implications. First, the Skeptic has at most indirect control over his suspension of judgment and so does not suspend judgment at will. Second, the skeptic accepts the norm of trut...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
2015
|
In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2015, Volume: 5, Issue: 2, Pages: 107-125 |
Further subjects: | B
Pyrrhonian skepticism
suspension of judgment
norms for belief
equipollence
reasons for belief
doxastic voluntarism
|
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |