A Problem for the Closure Argument
Contemporary discussions of skepticism often frame the skeptic’s argument around an instance of the closure principle. Roughly, the closure principle states that if a subject knows p, and knows that p entails q, then the subject knows q. The main contention of this paper is that the closure argument...
Published in: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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Authors: | ; |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
2014
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
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Further subjects: | B
closure principle
Moore’s proof
radical skepticism
transmission failure
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Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |