A Problem for the Closure Argument
Contemporary discussions of skepticism often frame the skeptic’s argument around an instance of the closure principle. Roughly, the closure principle states that if a subject knows p, and knows that p entails q, then the subject knows q. The main contention of this paper is that the closure argument...
Publié dans: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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Auteurs: | ; |
Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Brill
2014
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Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
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Sujets non-standardisés: | B
closure principle
Moore’s proof
radical skepticism
transmission failure
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Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
Résumé: | Contemporary discussions of skepticism often frame the skeptic’s argument around an instance of the closure principle. Roughly, the closure principle states that if a subject knows p, and knows that p entails q, then the subject knows q. The main contention of this paper is that the closure argument for skepticism is defective. We explore several possible classifications of the defect. The closure argument might plausibly be classified as begging the question, as exhibiting transmission failure, or as structurally inefficient. Interestingly, perhaps, each of these has been proposed as the correct classification of Moore’s proof of an external world. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contient: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-03021102 |