Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution
Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the e...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
2015
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2015, Volume: 5, Issue: 4, Pages: 296-314 |
Further subjects: | B
epistemic akrasia
higher-order evidence
rationality
charity
normativity
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Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |