An Argument for External World Skepticism from the Appearance/Reality Distinction
In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her concl...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
2016
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2016, Volume: 6, Issue: 4, Pages: 368-383 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Outside world
/ Scepticism
/ Appearance
/ Reality
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Further subjects: | B
reality distinction / appearance
contextualism
external world skepticism
knowledge closure
skeptical hypotheses
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Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |
Summary: | In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion (i.e., that S doesn’t know that p) without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by denying skeptical hypotheses or knowledge closure. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contains: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00503001 |