Miracles, Hinges, and Grammar in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
In §513 of On Certainty Wittgenstein asks “What if something really unheard-of happened?” But with this question he is not asking us to make a forecast, a prediction, or some sort of empirico-psychological prophecy about our possible reactions. As I will attempt to show, the question regarding the u...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
2016
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2016, Volume: 6, Issue: 2/3, Pages: 143-164 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951, Über Gewissheit
/ Philosophy of language
/ Cognition theory
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Further subjects: | B
Miracle
hinges
grammar
Moore
philosophical method
Experience
mistake
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Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
Summary: | In §513 of On Certainty Wittgenstein asks “What if something really unheard-of happened?” But with this question he is not asking us to make a forecast, a prediction, or some sort of empirico-psychological prophecy about our possible reactions. As I will attempt to show, the question regarding the unheard-of is part of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method—which is to say, it is one of the instruments with which he combats what he sees as the principal source of the confusions of philosophy: mistaking the grammatical for the empirical or, as he also says, the conceptual for the factual. In this sense the question regarding the unheard-of can shed some light on the grammatical status of what he calls “hinges.” |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contains: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00603005 |