In Defense of Piecemeal Skepticism
Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul suggest a version of skepticism according to which the skeptic posits a distinct skeptical hypothesis for each external world proposition that a person claims to know. In a recent issue of this journal, Eric Yang argues against this piecemeal approach. In this note...
| Publié dans: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2017
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| Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Monde extérieur
/ Fragment
/ Scepticisme
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| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
external world skepticism
piecemeal skepticism
skeptical hypothesis
brains in a vat
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| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Résumé: | Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul suggest a version of skepticism according to which the skeptic posits a distinct skeptical hypothesis for each external world proposition that a person claims to know. In a recent issue of this journal, Eric Yang argues against this piecemeal approach. In this note, I show that Yang’s argument against piecemeal skepticism is fallacious. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contient: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-006011231 |