Debunking Arguments from Insensitivity
Heightened awareness of the origins of our moral judgments pushes many in the direction of moral skepticism, in the direction of thinking we are unjustified in holding our moral judgments on a realist understanding of the moral truths. A classic debunking argument fleshes out this worry: the best ex...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
2017
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2017, Volume: 7, Issue: 2, Pages: 91-113 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Moral judgment
/ Moral realism
/ Scepticism
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Further subjects: | B
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
moral skepticism
epistemic sensitivity
epistemic reliability
moral explanations
Richard Joyce
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Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |