Debunking Arguments from Insensitivity

Heightened awareness of the origins of our moral judgments pushes many in the direction of moral skepticism, in the direction of thinking we are unjustified in holding our moral judgments on a realist understanding of the moral truths. A classic debunking argument fleshes out this worry: the best ex...

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Veröffentlicht in:International journal for the study of skepticism
1. VerfasserIn: Braddock, Matthew (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Brill 2017
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Moralisches Urteil / Moralischer Realismus / Skeptizismus
weitere Schlagwörter:B Evolutionary Debunking Arguments moral skepticism epistemic sensitivity epistemic reliability moral explanations Richard Joyce
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Zusammenfassung:Heightened awareness of the origins of our moral judgments pushes many in the direction of moral skepticism, in the direction of thinking we are unjustified in holding our moral judgments on a realist understanding of the moral truths. A classic debunking argument fleshes out this worry: the best explanation of our moral judgments does not appeal to their truth, so we are unjustified in holding our moral judgments. But it is unclear how to get from the explanatory premise to the debunking conclusion. This paper shows how to get from here to there by way of epistemic insensitivity. First, we reconstruct Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking argument from insensitivity. Second, we raise epistemological difficulties for Joyce’s argument. Third, we develop and defend a new debunking argument from insensitivity.
ISSN:2210-5700
Enthält:In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20171195