Arbitrariness, Irrationality, and the Sterility Objection: A Reply to Anderson
Does the contemporary Natural Law position that only heterosexual couples are capable of marriage rest upon an arbitrary and irrational distinction between same-sex couples and sterile heterosexual couples? Anderson (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):759-775, 2013: 759). There are many who...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2015]
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2015, Volume: 18, Issue: 1, Pages: 135-144 |
RelBib Classification: | NBE Anthropology NCF Sexual ethics VA Philosophy |
Further subjects: | B
Natural Law
Marriage
Sterility objection
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Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | Does the contemporary Natural Law position that only heterosexual couples are capable of marriage rest upon an arbitrary and irrational distinction between same-sex couples and sterile heterosexual couples? Anderson (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):759-775, 2013: 759). There are many who think so. In a recent article in these pages, Erik Anderson offers his case that these critics are correct. In what follows I examine Andersons argument and conclude that, whether or not one ultimately agrees with the New Natural Law account of marriage, the distinction found there between same sex couples and sterile heterosexual couples is neither arbitrary nor irrational. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-014-9513-0 |