Self-Representation & Good Determination

I argue that a distinction made in recent literature in the philosophy of mind between self-organizing and self-governing systems can serve as the basis of a principled distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ determination on the part of the compatibilist with respect to freedom or control. I first con...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Popejoy, Michael (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2015]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2015, Volume: 18, Issue: 1, Pages: 113-122
RelBib Classification:NCA Ethics
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Agential control Compatibilism Moral responsibility Self-representation Manipulation arguments
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)

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