We Can Believe the Error Theory

Bart Streumer argues that it is not possible for us to believe the error theory, where by ‘error theory’ he means the claim that our normative beliefs are committed to the existence of normative properties even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is indeed possible t...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Lillehammer, Hallvard 1970- (Author) ; Möller, Niklas (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: [2015]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2015, Volume: 18, Issue: 3, Pages: 453-459
RelBib Classification:VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy
Further subjects:B Belief Formation
B Error Theory
B Normative reasons
B Bart Streumer
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
Volltext (Publisher)
Volltext (doi)

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520 |a Bart Streumer argues that it is not possible for us to believe the error theory, where by ‘error theory’ he means the claim that our normative beliefs are committed to the existence of normative properties even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is indeed possible to believe the error theory. First, we suggest a critical improvement to Streumer’s argument. As it stands, one crucial premise of that argument—that we cannot have a belief while believing that there is no reason to have it—is implausibly strong. We argue that for his purposes, Streumer’s argument only requires a weaker premise, namely that we cannot rationally have a belief while believing that there is no reason to have it. Secondly, we go on to refute the improved argument. Even in its weaker form, Streumer’s argument is either invalid or the crucial premise should be rejected. 
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