Making Sense of Moral Perception
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Francis Hutchesons moral sense theory offers a satisfactory account of moral perception. I introduce Hutchesons work in §1 and indicate why the existence of a sixth sense is not implausible. I provide a summary of Robert Cowan and Robert Audis resp...
| Publié dans: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2015]
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| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
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| RelBib Classification: | NBE Anthropologie NCA Éthique TJ Époque moderne TK Époque contemporaine VA Philosophie ZD Psychologie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
moral perception
B Francis Hutcheson B Moral sense theory B Sensory modalities B Charles Darwin |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Francis Hutchesons moral sense theory offers a satisfactory account of moral perception. I introduce Hutchesons work in §1 and indicate why the existence of a sixth sense is not implausible. I provide a summary of Robert Cowan and Robert Audis respective theories of evaluative perception in §2, identifying three problematic objections: the Directness Objection to Cowans ethical perception and the aesthetic and perceptual model objections to Audis moral perception. §3 examines Hutchesons moral sense theory, focusing on his discussion of benevolence, the desire for the happiness of others. I deal with the unresolved issues in Hutchesons account by recourse to Charles Darwins evolutionary perspective on the moral sense in §4, arguing for the moral sense as the second-order faculty for judging benevolence. I return, in §5, to the objections, showing that moral sense theory solves all three problems and therefore offers a satisfactory account of moral perception. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9601-9 |