Morality,the Other and Third Persons
This paper seeks to defend the thesis that a justification of morality has to underline the role of the second person in addition to a perpetual and on-going change of perspective that likewise includes the third and first person. To support this argument, the paper conceptualises responsibility as...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2013]
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In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2013, Volume: 5, Issue: 4, Pages: 105-124 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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Summary: | This paper seeks to defend the thesis that a justification of morality has to underline the role of the second person in addition to a perpetual and on-going change of perspective that likewise includes the third and first person. To support this argument, the paper conceptualises responsibility as a moral relationship whose core constitutes the encounter with the other whom we recognise as a second-person authority. It then sketches how this pre-cognitive dimension must be supplemented by a cognitive insight which implies a dissociation from the second person and a consideration of third persons. on this basis, it finally provides an outline of how a possible tension between these different but all-together necessary perspectives could best be resolved. |
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Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v5i4.208 |