Questioning Gödel's Ontological Proof: Is Truth Positive?

In his “Ontological proof”, Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property f: If f is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Damschen, Gregor (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2011]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2011, Volume: 3, Issue: 1, Pages: 161-169
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei)

MARC

LEADER 00000naa a22000002 4500
001 156718040X
003 DE-627
005 20180115170006.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 180115s2011 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.24204/ejpr.v3i1.386  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)156718040X 
035 |a (DE-576)497180405 
035 |a (DE-599)BSZ497180405 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 0  |a 1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Damschen, Gregor  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Questioning Gödel's Ontological Proof  |b Is Truth Positive?  |c Gregor Damschen 
264 1 |c [2011] 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a In his “Ontological proof”, Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property f: If f is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads into a paradox when we apply it to the following self-reflexive sentences: (A) The truth value of A is not positive; (B) The truth value of B is positive. Given axiom 2, sentences A and B paradoxically cannot be both true or both false, and it is also impossible that one of the sentences is true whereas the other is false. 
601 |a Ontologie 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t European journal for philosophy of religion  |d Innsbruck : University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham, 2009  |g 3(2011), 1, Seite 161-169  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)718600770  |w (DE-600)2659606-4  |w (DE-576)477533728  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:3  |g year:2011  |g number:1  |g pages:161-169 
856 |u https://webapp.uibk.ac.at/ojs2/index.php/EJPR/article/download/386/357  |x unpaywall  |z Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang  |h publisher [open (via free pdf)] 
856 4 0 |u https://webapp.uibk.ac.at/ojs2/index.php/EJPR/article/view/386  |x Verlag  |z teilw. kostenfrei  |3 Volltext 
856 |u https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v3i1.386  |x doi  |3 Volltext 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 2992874086 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 156718040X 
LOK |0 005 20180115170006 
LOK |0 008 180115||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixzo 
OAS |a 1 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw 
REL |a 1 
SUB |a REL