God, Evil, and Alvin Plantinga on the Free-Will Defense
In this paper we will give a critical account of Plantingas well-known argument to the effect that the existence of an omnipotent and morally perfect God is consistent with the actual presence of evil. After presenting Plantingas view, we critically discuss both the idea of divine knowledge of con...
| Publié dans: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Collaborateurs: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2013]
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2013, Volume: 5, Numéro: 3, Pages: 75-94 |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Édition parallèle: | Non-électronique
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| Résumé: | In this paper we will give a critical account of Plantingas well-known argument to the effect that the existence of an omnipotent and morally perfect God is consistent with the actual presence of evil. After presenting Plantingas view, we critically discuss both the idea of divine knowledge of conditionals of freedom and the concept of transworld depravity. Then, we will sketch our own version of the Free-Will Defence, which maintains that moral evil depends on the misuse of human freedom. However, our argument does not hinge on problematic metaphysical assumptions, but depends only on a certain definition of a free act and a particular interpretation of divine omniscience. |
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v5i3.220 |