Two Types of Ontological Frame and Gödel's Ontological Proof

The aim of this essay is twofold. First, it outlines the concept of ontological frame (or structure). Secondly, two models are distinguished on this structure. The first one is connected to Kant’s concept of possible object and the second one relates to Leibniz’s. Leibniz maintains that the source o...

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Main Author: Galvan, Sergio (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2012]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2012, Volume: 4, Issue: 2, Pages: 147-168
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei)
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520 |a The aim of this essay is twofold. First, it outlines the concept of ontological frame (or structure). Secondly, two models are distinguished on this structure. The first one is connected to Kant’s concept of possible object and the second one relates to Leibniz’s. Leibniz maintains that the source of possibility is the mere logical consistency of the notions involved, so that possibility coincides with analytical possibility. Kant, instead, argues that consistency is only a necessary component of possibility. According to Kant, something is possible if there is a cause capable of bringing it into existence; to this end consistency alone is not sufficient. Thus, while the Leibnizian notion of consistency is at the root of the concept of analytical possibility, the Kantian notion of possibility is the source of real possibility. This difference plays an important role in the discussion of Gödel’s ontological proof, which can be formally interpreted on the ontological frame of the pure perfections. While this proof, under some emendation condition, is conclusive in the context of Leibniz’s ontological model, it is not so within the Kantian one. This issue will be the subject of the second part of the present essay. 
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