How Are We to Think of God's Freedom?
The paper discusses two conceptions of divine freedom. The first, Hugh McCanns, proposes that God is a timelessly eternal act, whose agency is not deliberative and who, in that act, creates himself and the contents of his will. God is such an act. Following discussion of this view, its costs and be...
| Publié dans: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2015]
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Dieu
/ Libre arbitre
/ Liberté
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion NBC Dieu |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | The paper discusses two conceptions of divine freedom. The first, Hugh McCanns, proposes that God is a timelessly eternal act, whose agency is not deliberative and who, in that act, creates himself and the contents of his will. God is such an act. Following discussion of this view, its costs and benefits, a more traditional account of Gods freedom, in which he possesses vestigial alternativity, the freedom to choose an alternative should there have been a sufficient reason to do so. |
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.104 |