A-Time Beats No Time. A Response to Brian Leftow
In this paper, I present a new argument against the compatibility of human free will and divine timelessness when conceiving of eternity in terms of an additional dimension as presented by brian leftow. The paper is organized as follows: After giving a brief sketch of leftows model, I argue that as...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2013]
|
In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2013, Volume: 5, Issue: 1, Pages: 55-70 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
|
Summary: | In this paper, I present a new argument against the compatibility of human free will and divine timelessness when conceiving of eternity in terms of an additional dimension as presented by brian leftow. The paper is organized as follows: After giving a brief sketch of leftows model, I argue that assuming libertarianism, free will presupposes presentism, since metaphysical indeterminism is only compatible with a presentist A-theory of physical time. Given this result, I make a case for the incompatibility of presentism and divine eternity modelled as a frame of reference, implying the incompatibility of the latter with human free will. |
---|---|
Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v5i1.248 |