Swinburne on the Simplicity of Theism
This paper argues that (1) richard Swinburnes general account of the simplicity of empirical hypotheses fails because it involves a deeply problematic notion of postulating a property, while there is a wide range of hypotheses where the assessment of simplicity rests entirely on the number and kind...
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2011]
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2011, Volume: 3, Numéro: 2, Pages: 409-426 |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Édition parallèle: | Non-électronique
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| Résumé: | This paper argues that (1) richard Swinburnes general account of the simplicity of empirical hypotheses fails because it involves a deeply problematic notion of postulating a property, while there is a wide range of hypotheses where the assessment of simplicity rests entirely on the number and kinds of postulated properties (2) Swinburnes main argument in The Christian God for the simplicity of theism, the one based on considerations about pure limitless intentional power, is significantly weaker than he seems to believe. The paper does not draw a conclusion about whether theism is simple. |
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v3i2.403 |