The Guilty Mind
The doctrine of mens rea can be expressed in this way: MRP: If A is culpable for performing f, then A performs f intentionally in circumstances in which it is impermissible to perform f. The Sermon on the Mount suggests the following principle: SMP: If A intends to perform f in circumstances in whic...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2009]
|
| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2009, Volume: 1, Issue: 1, Pages: 41-63 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
|
| Summary: | The doctrine of mens rea can be expressed in this way: MRP: If A is culpable for performing f, then A performs f intentionally in circumstances in which it is impermissible to perform f. The Sermon on the Mount suggests the following principle: SMP: If A intends to perform f in circumstances in which it would be impermissible for A to perform f, then As intending to perform f makes A as culpable as A would be were A to perform f. MRP and SMP are principles representative of intentionalism, a family of views that emphasizes the importance of intention to judgments about culpability. This essay examines an intentionalists defense of MRP with respect to lying, strict criminal liability, and the distinction between intention and foreseeability, along with a defense of SMP with respect to failed attempts, and self-defense. |
|---|---|
| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v1i1.329 |