Molinism, Creature-Types, and the Nature of Counterfactual Implication
Granting that there could be true subjunctive conditionals of libertarian freedom (SCls), I argue (roughly) that there could be such conditionals only in connection with individual "possible creatures" (in contrast to types). This implies that Molinism depends on the view that, prior to cr...
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
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Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2012]
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In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2012, Volume: 4, Issue: 1, Pages: 65-86 |
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Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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