Molinism, Creature-Types, and the Nature of Counterfactual Implication

Granting that there could be true subjunctive conditionals of libertarian freedom (SCls), I argue (roughly) that there could be such conditionals only in connection with individual "possible creatures" (in contrast to types). This implies that Molinism depends on the view that, prior to cr...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:European journal for philosophy of religion
Main Author: Murphy, Daniel (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2012]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2012, Volume: 4, Issue: 1, Pages: 65-86
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
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Parallel Edition:Non-electronic