Common Core/Diversity Dilemma, Agatheism and the Epistemology of Religious Belief
The essay The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean Thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief is a bold argument for the irrationality of first-order religious belief (that is, the belief that adherents to particular religions have). However, unlik...
| Publié dans: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2016]
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Religion
/ Égalité
/ Diversité
/ Foi
/ Théorie de la connaissance
/ Théisme
/ Le bien
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | The essay The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean Thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief is a bold argument for the irrationality of first-order religious belief (that is, the belief that adherents to particular religions have). However, unlike those associated with New Atheism, the papers authors Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican claim both that there are prospects for rational second-order religious belief (a religion-neutral belief in a designer of some sort) and that religious belief and practice can play a positive role in human life. In response to Thornhill-Miller and Millican, Janusz Salamon has argued that first- order religious belief can be rational, although not via the methods that philosophers who have typically defended the reasonability of faith have appealed to. Both papers are fascinating discussions of the epistemology of religious belief in general, and of the rationality of such commitment in light of modern science and religious disagreement in particular. In this paper, Ill object to a few points made in each essay and argue that neither paper provides good reason to be dubious about the religious belief being rational along traditional lines. |
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i4.1764 |