Agency Incompatibilism and Divine Agency
In this paper, I consider whether an argument for compatibilism about free will and determinism might be developed from the thought that Gods agency seems consistent with the rational determination of at least some divine actions by the True and the Good. I attempt to develop such an argument and t...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2015]
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2015, Volume: 7, Numéro: 3, Pages: 67-78 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
God
/ Plot
/ Free will
/ Determinism
|
| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion NBC Dieu |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | In this paper, I consider whether an argument for compatibilism about free will and determinism might be developed from the thought that Gods agency seems consistent with the rational determination of at least some divine actions by the True and the Good. I attempt to develop such an argument and then consider how to respond to it from the point of view of my own position, which I call Agency Incompatibilism. I argue that a crucial premise in the argument is ambiguous and offer responses to the argument on behalf of the Agency Incompatibilist, on each of the two disambiguations. |
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.105 |