God as the Simplest Explanation of the Universe

Inanimate explanation is to be analysed in terms of substances having powers and liabilities to exercise their powers under certain conditions; while personal explanation is to be analysed in terms of persons, their beliefs, powers, and purposes. A crucial criterion for an explanation being probably...

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Publié dans:European journal for philosophy of religion
Auteur principal: Swinburne, Richard (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2010]
Dans: European journal for philosophy of religion
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Résumé:Inanimate explanation is to be analysed in terms of substances having powers and liabilities to exercise their powers under certain conditions; while personal explanation is to be analysed in terms of persons, their beliefs, powers, and purposes. A crucial criterion for an explanation being probably true is that it is (among explanations leading us to expect the data) the simplest one. Simplicity is a matter of few substances, few kinds of substances, few properties (including powers and liabilities), few kinds of properties, and mathematically simple relations between properties. Explanation of the existence of the universe by the agency of God provides the simplest kind of personal explanation there can be, and one simpler than any inanimate explanation. I defend this view more thoroughly than previously in light of recent challenges.
Contient:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v2i1.348