A Phenomenological Approach with Ontological Implications? Charles Taylor and Maurice Mandelbaum on Explanation in Ethics
This paper critically discusses Charles Taylors ethical views in his little known paper Ethics and Ontology (J Philos 100 (6): 305-320, 2003) by confronting it with the moral phenomenology of Maurice Mandelbaum, as laid out in his (largely neglected) The Phenomenology of Moral Experience (1955)....
| Publié dans: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
|---|---|
| Auteur principal: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
|
| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
|
| RelBib Classification: | NCA Éthique TK Époque contemporaine VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Charles Taylor
B Ethics B Maurice Mandelbaum B Ontology B Moral phenomenology |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | This paper critically discusses Charles Taylors ethical views in his little known paper Ethics and Ontology (J Philos 100 (6): 305-320, 2003) by confronting it with the moral phenomenology of Maurice Mandelbaum, as laid out in his (largely neglected) The Phenomenology of Moral Experience (1955). The aim of the paper is to explore the significance of Taylors views for the dispute between naturalists, non-naturalists, and quietists in contemporary metaethics. It is divided in six sections. In the first section, I examine Taylors critique of naturalism. I continue to discuss his moral phenomenology in more detail in the second and third sections, arguing that Taylors move from phenomenology to ontology is problematic. In the fourth section, I evaluate Taylors strategy by comparing it with Mandelbaums understanding of moral phenomenology, while also extending this comparison to the issue of how to locate the source of moral experience in the fifth section. Based on these discussions, I finally conclude in the sixth section that Taylors hermeneutical position, although ontologically incomplete and underdemonstrated, draws attention to a question to which current moral theory does not adequately respond. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9837-7 |