Can religious and secular belief be rationally combined?
Sometimes the cognitive part of the human mind is modelled in a simplified way by degrees of belief. E.g., in philosophy of science and in formal epistemology agents are often identified by their credences in a set of claims. This line of dealing with the individual mind is currently expanded to gro...
| Publié dans: | International journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2017, Volume: 82, Numéro: 3, Pages: 299-319 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Foi
/ Personnalité religieuse
/ Rationalité
/ Interprétation non religieuse
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| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Applied dutch book argument
B OPINION (Philosophy) B Mind & Body B Rationality B Theodicy B FAITH & reason B THEORY of knowledge (Religion) B Religious Aspects B Wittgensteinian tradition B Opinion pooling B Religious Mind B The problem of evil |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | Sometimes the cognitive part of the human mind is modelled in a simplified way by degrees of belief. E.g., in philosophy of science and in formal epistemology agents are often identified by their credences in a set of claims. This line of dealing with the individual mind is currently expanded to groups by attempts of finding adequate ways of pooling individual degrees of belief into an overall group credence or, more abstractly speaking, into a collective mind. In this paper, we model religious people's minds as such a collective mind. Religious people are therein identified with a set of degrees of beliefs containing religious and secular credences. E.g., within a religious context a person may be sure that some statement is true, whereas the same person lacks non-religious support for such a credence and hence may doubt the truth of that statement within a secular context. We will also present two results on the adequacy of this model. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-017-9613-6 |