A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity

The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P at time T is numerically identical with a person P at a later time T, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in v...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal for philosophy of religion
Main Author: Berger, Jacob (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2018]
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2018, Volume: 83, Issue: 1, Pages: 41-55
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Transmigration of souls / Person / Identity / Body
Further subjects:B Souls
B Persistence over time
B Bodily and psychological continuity
B Personal Identity
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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520 |a The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P at time T is numerically identical with a person P at a later time T, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either (a) souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which case the soul theory faces an analogue problem of diachronic soul identity, or (b) souls, unlike physical bodies, do not change over time, in which case the soul theory cannot explain why souls relate to particular bodies over time and so at best only partially explains personal identity. I conclude that the soul theory fares no better than physicalist-friendly accounts of personal identity such as bodily- or psychological-continuity-based views. 
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