A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity
The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P at time T is numerically identical with a person P at a later time T, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in v...
Published in: | International journal for philosophy of religion |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2018, Volume: 83, Issue: 1, Pages: 41-55 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Transmigration of souls
/ Person
/ Identity
/ Body
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Further subjects: | B
Souls
B Persistence over time B Bodily and psychological continuity B Personal Identity |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |