Basic beliefs and Christian faith

In rejecting Plantinga's ‘reformed epistemology', Jeremy Koons has argued that no beliefs are epistemically basic, since even perceptual beliefs arise from observations that are theory-dependent. But even if all observations are theory-dependent, not all theories are alike. Beliefs that ar...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Dawes, Gregory W. 1957- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Cambridge Univ. Press [2015]
In: Religious studies
Year: 2015, Volume: 51, Issue: 1, Pages: 61-74
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Certitude / Christianity / Faith
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
CB Christian life; spirituality
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
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Summary:In rejecting Plantinga's ‘reformed epistemology', Jeremy Koons has argued that no beliefs are epistemically basic, since even perceptual beliefs arise from observations that are theory-dependent. But even if all observations are theory-dependent, not all theories are alike. Beliefs that are dependent on uncontroversial bodies of theory may be ‘basic' in the sense that they play a foundational role in the acquisition of knowledge. There is, however, another problem with reformed epistemology. It is that even if Christian beliefs were basic in this sense, they could face evidential challenge, for the epistemic status of a ‘basic' belief depends, in part, on its probabilistic or explanatory relations to our other beliefs. It follows that Christian faith remains vulnerable to evidential arguments, such as Paul Draper's argument from evil.
ISSN:1469-901X
Contains:Enthalten in: Religious studies
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S0034412514000250