Is theism a simple hypothesis? The simplicity of omni-properties
One reason for thinking that theism is a relatively simple theory - and that it is thereby more likely to be true than other theories, ceteris paribus - is to insist that infinite degrees of properties are simpler than extremely large, finite degrees of properties. This defence of theism has been ch...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2016]
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| Dans: |
Religious studies
Année: 2016, Volume: 52, Numéro: 1, Pages: 45-61 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Théisme
/ Hypothèse
/ Simplicité divine
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | One reason for thinking that theism is a relatively simple theory - and that it is thereby more likely to be true than other theories, ceteris paribus - is to insist that infinite degrees of properties are simpler than extremely large, finite degrees of properties. This defence of theism has been championed by Richard Swinburne in recent years. I outline the objections to this line of argument present in the literature, and suggest some novel resources open to Swinburne in defence. I then argue that scientists' preference for universal nomological propositions constitutes a very strong reason for supposing that theism is simpler than parodical alternatives in virtue of its positing omni-properties rather than parallel mega-properties'. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412514000523 |