The metaphysics of belief: a Wittgenstein and Collingwood convergence
In this article I make plausible a metaphysics of belief' by showing how Collingwood's metaphysics of absolute presuppositions helps us understand various comments and fragments by Wittgenstein regarding the metaphysical subject'. For both, metaphysical beliefs are presuppositional;...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2017]
|
In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2017, Volume: 53, Issue: 4, Pages: 497-520 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Collingwood, Robin G. 1889-1943
/ Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951
/ Faith
/ Metaphysics
|
RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | In this article I make plausible a metaphysics of belief' by showing how Collingwood's metaphysics of absolute presuppositions helps us understand various comments and fragments by Wittgenstein regarding the metaphysical subject'. For both, metaphysical beliefs are presuppositional; as such, they constitute twin foci - a terminus ad quem and a terminus a quo - without which the activity of thinking rationally, scientifically, and morally is impossible. Finally, although for both philosophers metaphysical beliefs are not susceptible to conventional modes of explanation, justification, and verification, both seem to suggest in various ways that metaphysical beliefs are nevertheless susceptible to a certain kind of practical' justification. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1469-901X |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412516000354 |