Religious education and religious choice
According to the "religious choice case" for compulsory religious education, pupils have a right to be made aware of the religious and irreligious paths open to them and equipped with the wherewithal to choose between them. A familiar objection to this argument is that the idea of religiou...
Publié dans: | Journal of beliefs and values |
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Auteur principal: | |
Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Routledge
[2015]
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Dans: |
Journal of beliefs and values
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RelBib Classification: | AA Sciences des religions AH Pédagogie religieuse |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
religious choice
B doxastic voluntarism B Religious Education B Religious Belief B leap of faith B Personal Autonomy |
Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Verlag) |
Résumé: | According to the "religious choice case" for compulsory religious education, pupils have a right to be made aware of the religious and irreligious paths open to them and equipped with the wherewithal to choose between them. A familiar objection to this argument is that the idea of religious choice reduces religion to a matter of taste. I argue, first, that this familiar objection fails and, second, that we nevertheless have good reason to reject the religious choice case. Religious and irreligious views have a core cognitive dimension that makes it inappropriate to talk of choosing between them. What I have elsewhere called the "possibility-of-truth case" remains the strongest justification for compulsory religious education. |
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ISSN: | 1469-9362 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Journal of beliefs and values
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/13617672.2015.1013817 |