Can fictionalists have faith?
According to non-doxastic theories of propositional faith, belief that p is not necessary for faith that p. Rather, propositional faith merely requires a positive cognitive attitude'. This broad condition, however, can be satisfied by several pragmatic approaches to a domain, including fiction...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2018]
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| In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2018, Volume: 54, Issue: 2, Pages: 215-232 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Fiktionalismus
/ Christianity
/ Faith
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | According to non-doxastic theories of propositional faith, belief that p is not necessary for faith that p. Rather, propositional faith merely requires a positive cognitive attitude'. This broad condition, however, can be satisfied by several pragmatic approaches to a domain, including fictionalism. This article shows precisely how fictionalists can have faith given non-doxastic theory, and explains why this is problematic. It then explores one means of separating the two theories, in virtue of the fact that the truth of the propositions in a discourse is of little consequence for fictionalists, whereas their truth matters deeply for the faithful. Although promising, this approach incurs several theoretical costs, hence providing a compelling reason to favour a purely doxastic account of faith. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412517000063 |