Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness
It is often alleged that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves a negative interpersonal response for that transgression, blaming responses such as resentment and indignation being paradigms. Aside from a few exceptions, guilt is cited in...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2018, Volume: 21, Issue: 2, Pages: 291-309 |
RelBib Classification: | NCB Personal ethics VA Philosophy |
Further subjects: | B
Blameworthiness
B Liability B Moral Responsibility B Blame B Desert B Guilt |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
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520 | |a It is often alleged that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves a negative interpersonal response for that transgression, blaming responses such as resentment and indignation being paradigms. Aside from a few exceptions, guilt is cited in recent discussions of moral responsibility, if at all, as merely an effect of being blamed, or as a reliable indicator of moral responsibility, but not itself an explanation of moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves to feel moral guilt for that transgression. I argue that this alternative view offers all that the predominant blame-focused view offers, while also solving some puzzling features of moral responsibility. Specifically, it offers a compelling way to reconcile conflicting intuitions about the suberogatory, and allows those who do not understand what Darwall calls second-personal' reasons to be morally responsible for their immoral acts. | ||
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650 | 4 | |a Moral Responsibility | |
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