Sentimentalismo escocés: Hume y Smith contra el egoísmo moral
The Scottish sentimentalist philosophers David Hume and Adam Smith suggest different strategies for restricting and accommodating human selfish tendencies. In spite of the obvious similarities of their moral proposals, Smith finds within the human being the capacity to transform his partial passions...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Espagnol |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
2018
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| Dans: |
Veritas
Année: 2018, Volume: 39, Pages: 55-74 |
| RelBib Classification: | KBF Îles britanniques NBE Anthropologie NCB Éthique individuelle TJ Époque moderne VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
David Hume
B convenciones B Adam Smith B autocontrol / autodirección B conventions B self-command B Sentimentalism B sentimentalismo moral |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | The Scottish sentimentalist philosophers David Hume and Adam Smith suggest different strategies for restricting and accommodating human selfish tendencies. In spite of the obvious similarities of their moral proposals, Smith finds within the human being the capacity to transform his partial passions and to aspire to ideals of perfection. In contrast, Hume's sentimentalism does not allow for self-transformation, and must rely on social conventions to manipulate and redirect selfish impulses from without. Both attempts achieve their goal. However, while for Hume peaceful social interaction seems to be the only aim of morality; for Smith morality also opens a new dimension of development for the human being. |
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| ISSN: | 0718-9273 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Veritas
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.4067/S0718-92732018000100055 |
