Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?
John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly's recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer's claim is...
| Veröffentlicht in: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2018]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Molinismus
/ Handlungsfreiheit
/ Vorherwissen
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus NCB Individualethik VB Logik; philosophische Hermeneutik; philosophische Erkenntnislehre |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Molinism
B Free Will B Middle Knowledge B Foreknowledge |
| Online Zugang: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Zusammenfassung: | John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly's recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer's claim is ambiguous, and that it may turn out to be false on at least one reading, but only if the Molinist can explain how God knows true counterfactuals of freedom. |
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| Enthält: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v10i2.1983 |