Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?
John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly's recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer's claim is...
| Publié dans: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2018]
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Molinisme
/ Liberté d'action
/ Préscience
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion NCB Éthique individuelle VB Herméneutique; philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Molinism
B Free Will B Middle Knowledge B Foreknowledge |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly's recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer's claim is ambiguous, and that it may turn out to be false on at least one reading, but only if the Molinist can explain how God knows true counterfactuals of freedom. |
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v10i2.1983 |