Irrational Option Exclusion

In this paper, I describe a hitherto overlooked kind of practical irrationality, which I call irrational option exclusion. An agent who suffers from this problem does not merely fail to act on her best judgement - she fails to realize that the superior action is even an option for her. I furthermore...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Ethical theory and moral practice
Main Author: Jeppsson, Sofia (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2018]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
RelBib Classification:NCA Ethics
VA Philosophy
ZD Psychology
Further subjects:B Ability to do otherwise
B Moral Responsibility
B Practical irrationality
B Quality of will
B Reasons-responsiveness
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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Summary:In this paper, I describe a hitherto overlooked kind of practical irrationality, which I call irrational option exclusion. An agent who suffers from this problem does not merely fail to act on her best judgement - she fails to realize that the superior action is even an option for her. I furthermore argue that this kind of irrationality is serious enough to undermine moral responsibility. I show that an agent suffering from this problem has compromised reasons-responsiveness, does not really express her will through action, and has a hard time doing otherwise; thus, from the standpoint of several popular moral responsibility theories, we ought to conclude that her responsibility is at the very least diminished.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9897-3