Prudential Versus Probative Arguments for Religious Faith: Descartes and Pascal on Reason and Faith
In this article, I show that Pascal's prudential agenda, centered on the Wager, more successfully overcomes the restrictions of Pyrrhonic skepticism expressed by Montaigne than Descartes' probative philosophy, which was based on his ontological argument for God's existence. Descarte...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
MDPI
[2017]
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| In: |
Religions
Year: 2017, Volume: 8, Issue: 8, Pages: 1-15 |
| Further subjects: | B
Prudential Reasoning
B knowledge of God B Pascal B Descartes |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
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| 520 | |a In this article, I show that Pascal's prudential agenda, centered on the Wager, more successfully overcomes the restrictions of Pyrrhonic skepticism expressed by Montaigne than Descartes' probative philosophy, which was based on his ontological argument for God's existence. Descartes' attempt to base natural science on the metaphysical certainty of a non-deceiving God fails because he cannot prove that a non-deceiving Perfect Being is a clear and distinct idea. Pascal's attempt to base the knowledge of God upon the reasons of the heart accepts the epistemological restrictions of skepticism but provides a reason to develop passionate faith, thereby overcoming skepticism. I also show that Descartes and Pascal had different assumptions about the workings of the mind; Descartes relied on a model of the mind as a theater, which hindered his agenda, and Pascal upon a holistic model, which enabled him to make a prudential argument which was cognitively convincing. | ||
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